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1. Introduction. According to the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA), the existence of life in 
our universe confirms the hypothesis that there are many universes (the Multiverse 
Hypothesis (HM)) over the hypothesis that our universe is the only one (the Universe 
Hypothesis (HU)). Roger White (2000), following Ian Hacking (1987), has challenged 
FTA on the grounds that the reasoning behind it violates the Requirement of Total 
Evidence (RTE), which dictates that we must always assess hypotheses in light of the 
most specific evidence at our disposal. Below, I show that, despite its near universal 
acceptance, RTE delivers the wrong verdict in cases like that involved in the debate about 
FTA. Such cases, I argue, ought to be assessed in light of a principle that is already 
embodied in sound scientific practice: the Predesignation Requirement, which demands 
that, in assessing the outcome of a probabilistic process, we characterize both the hypoth-
eses we are evaluating and the outcome observed in a way that was salient prior to 
actually observing the outcome. Following the Predesignation Requirement means 
ignoring some of our evidence (namely, evidence characterized in a way not salient prior 
to observing the outcome); it thus means violating RTE. But, as I will show, following 
the Predesignation Requirement gives us the right verdicts in some simple cases in which 
RTE leads us astray; and, when applied to FTA, the Predesignation Requirement leads to 
the conclusion that our evidence does indeed confirm HM. 
 
2. White’s Objection and RTE. The reasoning behind FTA seems, at first glance, quite 
straightforward: The conditions needed to support life are extremely unlikely to occur in 
any given universe, according to our best cosmological theories. So those conditions 
would be much more likely to occur if there were many universes. We know that those 
conditions have indeed occurred (just look around!), so we have evidence that HM is true. 
White’s objection to the argument begins with the observation that we in fact have two 
pieces of evidence about the existence of a life-supporting universe: we know that some 
universe is life-supporting (call this evidence EG); but we also know that this specific 
universe (our universe; call it α) is life-supporting (call this evidence ES). EG, on its own, 
does indeed support HM over HU: the chances of there being some life-supporting uni-
verse are higher the more universes there are. ES, on the other hand, does not support HM 
over HU: α’s chances of supporting life are insensitive to whether many (or any) other 
universes exist. Thus, in suggesting that our evidence makes HM more likely than HU, 
advocates of FTA must be relying on the less-specific EG rather than the more-specific 
ES; their reasoning should therefore be rejected, according to White, because it violates 
RTE. 
White’s analysis of FTA is based on a Bayesian framework for assessing competing 
hypotheses, according to which hypothesis H1 is confirmed over hypothesis H2 by 
evidence E just in case E is more likely to have occurred given H1 than it is given H2 (see 
Jeffrey et al. (1962), Hacking (1965), Sober (2009)). We can label this the Likelihood 
Principle (LP), and we can formalize it as follows: 
 
This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on June 21, 2017 10:01:26 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
  Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 




LP. E is evidence for H1 over H2 iff P(E|H1) > P(E|H2) 
 
So, in claiming that our evidence confirms HM over HU, advocates of FTA are claiming 
that we have some piece of evidence, E, such that P(E|HM) > P(E|HU).1 In order to 
evaluate this claim, we will need to determine what the relevant evidence (E) is. The two 
possibilities seem to be ES and EG. 
As noted above, White contends that EG confirms HM over HU, but ES does not. To see 
why, think of the beginning of each universe as a causally-isolated chance event, say the 
spinning of a giant roulette wheel with a billion slots. The fine-tuning data suggest that a 
universe’s being life-supporting is extremely unlikely; it is like hitting a single specific 
slot on the billion-slotted wheel.2 So the chance of some universe’s being life-supporting 
is greater if there are many universes, just as the chance of some roulette wheel’s hitting 
that lucky number is greater if there are many wheels. This shows that EG supports HM 
over HU. 
But if we focus just on α, and its “roulette wheel,” we can see that it is no more likely 
that α would be life-supporting if there are many other universes than if ours is the only 
one. According to HM, each universe that exists on is causally isolated from the others; so 
whether universes other than α exist cannot affect the likelihood that α is life-supporting. 
Summing this up in terms of LP, we have: 
 
P(EG|HM) > P(EG|HU) 
P(ES|HM) = P(ES|HU) 
 
																																								 																				
1 Note that the claim at issue concerns whether the evidence about the existence of life 
offers incremental confirmation of HM over HU. In assessing this question, I will not be 
assessing whether it is overall rational to accept HM. The latter question depends on many 
factors, including how well our total scientific evidence (including our knowledge of the 
specific values of constants in our universe) supports various specific cosmological 
theories. There are many different versions of HM in the scientific literature, which are 
supported to varying degrees by contemporary physics. I won’t be evaluating particular 
versions of HM individually here. 
2 This analogy to randomizing mechanisms, like roulette wheels, in discussions of the 
origins of the universe is common, if somewhat obscure. The idea is that the values of the 
fundamental constants and the initial conditions have to be “set” within an incredibly 
narrow range to even allow for matter to exist, so a given big bang’s resulting in life-
supporting conditions is incredibly improbable. But the conditions are of course not “set” 
by any spatiotemporal process that intelligibly mirrors the spinning of a giant roulette 
wheel; so it is unclear how we ought to think of assigning probabilities in this context. I’ll 
follow White in ignoring this complication here.  
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The crucial question now becomes which piece of evidence—EG or ES—is the one we 
should use in assessing the likelihood of HM and HU. 
White (2000, 264) claims that ES is the version of the evidence we must use in as-
sessing HM and HU. He defends this claim by pointing to RTE, which he states as a 
general principle of reasoning: “in the confirming of hypotheses, we cannot, as a general 
rule, set aside a specific piece of evidence in favor of a weaker piece.” ES is a more 
specific version of EG. RTE thus requires that we use ES rather than EG in evaluating 
hypotheses; thus, we do not get any confirmation of HM over HU. 
RTE plays a crucial role in White’s argument against FTA, and, intuitively, the princi-
ple has some appeal: it seems reasonable to think that we should always use all of the 
information at our disposal in assessing our evidence. But, as I will show below, there are 
cases where RTE should not be applied: in some cases, proper reasoning dictates that we 
use a more-general version of the evidence at hand, rather than a more-specific version. 
 
3. Trouble for RTE. Consider the following case, introduced by White (2000, 267): 
 
Case B. Jane knows that an unspecified number of players will simultaneously 
roll a pair of dice just once, and that she will be woken if, and only if, a double-
six is rolled. Upon being woken she infers that there were several players rolling 
dice. 
 
White’s (plausible) assessment of this case is that Jane’s reasoning is cogent. The evi-
dence she obtains upon being woken is: 
 
EG. Some player rolled a double-six. 
 
And the hypothesis that there were multiple players (HMP) is confirmed over the hypothe-
sis that there was just one player (HOP) by EG, since P(EG|HMP) > P(EG|HOP). That is, it is 
more likely that some player rolled a double-six if there were many players rather than 
just one. 
Here, White condones Jane’s use of a general statement of her evidence (“Some play-
er rolled a double-six”) in assessing the likelihood of the hypotheses, so we might wonder 
whether White’s own case is a counter-example to RTE. According to White, though, 
Jane does not violate RTE because she is using the most-specific version of her evidence; 
White claims that Jane simply lacks any more-specific evidence: “Jane’s evidence is not 
about the outcome of a particular roll, but simply the fact that she has been woken” 
(White 2000, 268). 
This claim is, however, simply false. Jane can state her evidence in the general form 
“Some player rolled a double-six,” but she could also state it in a more specific form: 
“The player whose roll actually led to my being awoken rolled a double-six.” Jane can 
even use this description to rigidly designate that player, perhaps inventing a name for 
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that player (call her “Asha”), a la Kripke’s story about Jack the Ripper.3 So Jane also has 
the following piece of evidence: 
 
ES. Asha rolled a double-six. 
 
Does ES confirm HMP? That is, was it more likely that Asha’s roll would come up double-
six if there were many players? Certainly not: no matter how many other players there 
were (zero or a million), Asha’s roll had a 1/36 chance of being double-six. So P(ES|HMP) 
= P(EG|HOP). 
We now have a case with the structure described in §1: a more-specific characteriza-
tion of the evidence, ES, does not confirm HMP over HOP, while a less-specific characteri-
zation, EG, does. And, if we follow RTE, we will conclude that Jane, in spite of initial 
appearances, has no reason to favor HMP over HOP. Just by going through a bit of clever 
rigid-designation, Jane has vitiated the force of her evidence! 
This is surely the wrong verdict; and so, we seem to have found a case in which proper 
reasoning dictates that we violate RTE, and stick to a less-specific formulation of our 
evidence in applying LP. Still, we might think this is a rather limited result: the clever 
rigid-designation involved in the case might seem fishy, and the dice-rolling scenario 
itself is rather artificial. But a further case reveals just how far-reaching a threat RTE, 
taken as a fully general principle, would pose to our ability to confirm hypotheses in the 
light of our evidence. Consider the following example:4 
 
Fish. You know there are some large fish and some small fish in a lake, but you 
don’t know the proportions: either there are mostly large fish (HL) or mostly small 
fish (HS). You know that you will catch one fish each time you stick in your net. 
You stick in your net and catch a large fish. 
 
Let’s describe your evidence in the following way: 
 
EG. You caught some large fish. 
 
EG would seem to give you evidence in favor of HL over HS, since you are more likely to 
catch a large fish if the majority of the fish are large than if the majority of the fish are 
																																								 																				
3 The label “Jack the Ripper” was coined to denote the person killing people in London in 
1888; the reference of the term was initially fixed through that description. But the term, 
having had its reference fixed in this way, could then function as a rigid designator for a 
particular person: we could say things like, “Jack the Ripper might not have gone around 
killing those poor women if he’d only had a happier childhood” (see Kripke 1980, 79). 
4 This example, originally due to Eddington (1939), is adapted from Kotzen (2012). 
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small: P(EG|HL) > P(EG|HS). Reasoning in this way seems like a paradigm example of 
empirically confirming a hypothesis, and, as such, it seems beyond reproach. 
But wait! The fish you caught, in addition to being large, is a particular fish (as fish 
tend to be). You name her Asha (ostensively, without need of any clever rigid-
designation). So you also have the evidence: 
 
ES. You caught Asha. 
 
We can now ask whether ES is more likely given HL than given HS: Were you more likely 
to catch Asha if there were mostly large fish, rather than mostly small fish? 
It seems clear that you were equally likely to catch Asha on either hypothesis: whatev-
er the size of the other fish, the likelihood that your net would happen upon the specific 
large fish Asha was exactly the same. Asha was swimming along, and happened to be in 
the wrong place at the wrong time. The probability of that event is presumably sensitive 
to such factors as how frequently Asha swims in that area of the lake. But one thing that 
seems completely irrelevant is the size of the other fish around her. So, once again, the 
specific evidence fails to confirm the hypothesis: P(ES|HL) = P(ES|HS). Thus, if we follow 
RTE, we will be led to the false conclusion that we get no confirmation of HL over HS. 
 
The above cases show that we should not always follow RTE in evaluating the likelihood 
of competing hypotheses. There are cases in which proper reasoning requires ignoring a 
more-specific statement of our evidence in favor of a less-specific version. Thus, White 
cannot simply appeal to RTE to justify his claim that we must reason on the basis of ES, 
rather than EG, in assessing FTA. 
We might wonder, though, whether assessing the probability of HM in the context of 
FTA is a case like the ones I’ve been describing, in which we should use our less-specific 
evidence. For there certainly are other cases in which we should use our more-specific 
evidence. Consider another case of White’s: 
 
Case B*. Jane knows that she is one of an unspecified number of sleepers each of 
whom has a unique partner who will roll a pair of dice. Each sleeper will be wok-
en if and only if her partner rolls a double-six. Upon being woken, Jane infers that 
there are several sleepers and dice-rollers. (White 2000, 268) 
 
Jane knows a more-specific and a less-specific fact: 
 
EG. Some player rolled double-six. 
ES. Jane’s partner (call her “Asha”) rolled double-six. 
 
And we again have the same evidential structure: The more-specific evidence does not 
confirm the hypothesis, since the probability that Asha would roll double-six is insensi-
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tive to the existence of other sleepers and other rollers (P(E|HMP) = P(E|HOP)). But the 
less-specific evidence does confirm the hypothesis: it is more likely that some player will 
roll double-six if there are many players (P(E|HMP) > P(E|HOP)). And in this case, it 
seems Jane would do well to focus on her more-specific evidence, ES: Jane doesn’t have 
any reason to think there were other sleepers when she wakes up, because she knew that 
either way (whether she was the only sleeper or one of many), her chances of being 
awoken were simply 1/36. Imagine Jane the night before she goes to sleep, wondering 
whether there are other sleepers, and trying to comfort herself by thinking there are. This 
is a badly misguided attempt at self-help: the presence of compatriots—though it makes it 
more likely that some sleeper will be awoken—fails to improve Jane’s own chances of 
waking up, which depend solely on Asha’s roll. 
So what marks off the cases in which we should use our more specific evidence (Case 
B*) from those in which we should not (Case B; Fish), and on which side of the line does 
the FTA evidence fall? The situation here is quite puzzling: cases that seem structurally 
identical require different applications of LP; and, in some of those cases, we seem to be 
required to ignore parts of what we observe in order to correctly assess the evidential 
import of our observations. In what follows, I will argue that, in order to sort out these 
cases, we must address two distinct instances of the reference class problem that arise in 
connection with FTA: in applying LP to the evidence at hand, we need to attend both to 
(1) how we classify the contents of our observations; and (2) how we think of our own 
role as observers. 
 
4. The Reference Class Problem. Assessing the evidential import of an observation 
using LP requires assigning that observation a probability, conditional on two different 
hypotheses. As a general rule, in order to assign probabilities to observations, those 
observations must be classified as members of a class of possible outcomes. Suppose you 
roll a die and get a six. Someone asks, “How likely was that outcome?” Before answer-
ing, you will need to classify the outcome in some way. If you classify it as a member of 
the class of sixes, the answer is 1/6, since one-sixth of the possible outcomes of a die-roll 
fall into that class. If you instead classify the very same outcome as a member of the class 
of evens, the answer is ½. The different answers here turn on which of the possible 
outcomes that do not occur—a four, for example—should be counted as an instance of 
the same type as the actual outcome. And that depends on which type, out of the many 
under which it falls, you use in classifying the observed outcome (the six you actually 
rolled). 
This question—Which type is relevant in classifying the outcome?—is what is at issue 
in the cases discussed above. In applying LP to determine whether we get confirmation 
from our evidence, we need to decide between two different descriptions of an observed 
outcome, which designate that outcome in terms of its membership in two different 
classes of possible outcomes. EG describes the outcome as falling under a broad class of 
possible outcomes (in Case B*, for instance, EG classifies the outcome as a member of 
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the class of double-six rolls), while ES describes it as falling under a narrower sub-class 
(ES classifies that same outcome as a member of the class of double-six rolls by Asha). 
What we are interested in, in applying LP, is not the unconditional probability of the 
observed outcome (P(E)), but rather the conditional probabilities P(E|H1) and P(E|H2). 
And, as we’ve seen, those conditional probabilities (which determine whether the obser-
vation confirms H1 over H2) change, depending on which reference class we use in 
stating the evidence E. Thus, what we have is a classic example of the reference class 
problem, as described by Alan Hájek: “The reference class problem arises when we want 
to assign a probability to a single proposition [or event], X, which may be classified in 
various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified…. X may 
be classified as belonging to set S1, or to set S2…. Qua member of S1, its probability is p1; 
qua member of S2, its probability is p2, where p1 ≠ p2” (Hájek 2007, 565). 
So we could decide which version of the evidence to use in each case if we had a solu-
tion to the reference class problem – if we had some rule for deciding which reference 
class was relevant in assessing the conditional probabilities associated with a given 
observed outcome. One way of understanding RTE is as proposing just such a rule: 
according to RTE, we should always use the narrowest reference class under which we 
can classify our observation in assessing that observation’s evidential import. But, as we 
saw above, RTE sometimes fails to deliver the correct verdict, and so it must be rejected. 
I won’t be offering an alternative general solution to the reference class problem. In-
stead, I want to draw out some lessons about how to deal with the problem in the particu-
lar kinds of cases discussed above. What those cases reveal, I claim, is that, in applying 
LP, we should describe the observed outcome in terms of a reference class of possible 
outcomes that was salient antecedent to the observation itself. That is, in assessing the 
evidential import of the outcome of some probabilistic process, we must not characterize 
that outcome in terms of a reference class that became salient only because of the specific 
result of the probabilistic process. Such post hoc classifications of the possible outcomes 
of the process can mask the genuine confirmation an observation provides. 
 
5. The Predesignation Requirement. Consider the case of Fish, in which the outcome 
event is the catching of a specific large fish, Asha. There are two relevant reference 
classes under which we could classify this outcome: large-fish-catchings and Asha-
catchings. These different choices of reference class give us two different partitions of 
the space of possible outcomes: we can divide the possible outcomes into Asha-catchings 
and Non-Asha-Catchings, or into Large-Fish-Catchings and Small-Fish-Catchings (see 
figure 1). 
As argued above, if we employ LP by using the more specific reference class, we get 
the wrong result: since the observation, characterized as a member of the class of Asha-
catchings, is no more likely on HL than on HS (as shown in the right-hand side of figure 
1), employing LP in this way would lead us to conclude (falsely) that we have no confir-
mation of HL over HS. 
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Figure 1. The space of possible outcomes is partitioned in two different ways (left-hand 
side vs. right-hand side), as determined by the two relevant reference classes into which 
the actual outcome falls. Under each partition, the outcomes that are in the same refer-
ence class as the actual outcome form the unshaded region; those that are not form the 
shaded region. (Equivalently: the size of the unshaded regions in the left-hand side of the 
diagram represent the conditional probabilities EG|HL and EG|HS, while those in the right-
hand side represent the conditional probabilities ES|HL and ES|HS.) Comparing the 
relative sizes of the unshaded regions in the upper and lower rows under each of the 
partitions, we see that whether the likelihood of the observed outcome is greater given HL 
than it is given HS (whether the unshaded region is larger in the top row than in the 
bottom row) depends on whether we classify that outcome as a large-fish-catching (left-
hand side) or an Asha-catching (right-hand side). 
 
Intuitively, the reason we get the wrong result here is that the more specific reference 
class does not accurately capture the nature of the experiment performed. In sticking our 
net into the lake, we didn’t antecedently partition the possible outcomes into Asha-
catchings and non-Asha-catchings, and hope to obtain evidence about the fish population 
in virtue of our observation falling into one of those two classes. We didn’t have a view 
about how each of the possible “Asha outcomes” would affect our credence in the 
competing hypotheses, because we simply didn’t have any way of thinking of Asha at all. 
Instead, we came to be focused on the Asha-catchings reference class only as a result of 
the actual outcome of the experiment. So to treat the result of the experiment as providing 
evidence in virtue of falling into the class of Asha-catchings is to misrepresent the 
evidential import of the probabilistic process that we observed. 
The problem here stems from a failure to respect what is sometimes called the “Pre-
designation Requirement,” a widely-accepted rule of sound scientific practice (see Staley 
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2002). It is a familiar point that experimental design should ideally have the following 
structure. First, a hypothesis is generated. Then, an experimental procedure is designed to 
test the hypothesis against an alternate hypothesis (often the null hypothesis). The possi-
ble outcomes of the procedure are identified, and the evidential import of each possible 
outcome is assessed: the experimenters determine how their credences in the competing 
hypotheses ought to be updated, if a given possible outcome is observed. Then the 
experiment is run, the observation is made, and credences are updated accordingly. 
A standard worry in experimental science arises when, instead of following this pro-
cedure, experimenters first observe the outcome of the experiment, and then use that 
outcome to generate hypotheses post hoc. Notoriously, such violations of the Predesigna-
tion Requirement—sometimes referred to as “data-mining” or “over-fitting”—can lead to 
the appearance of statistically significant experimental outcomes when no real confirma-
tion has occurred. 
When we use the narrower reference class in describing our evidence in the case of 
Fish we are guilty of a similar, but distinct, violation of the Predesignation Requirement. 
In this case, the hypotheses being tested—HL and HS—are not generated on the basis of 
the experimental outcomes. Instead, what is determined post hoc, on the basis of the 
observed outcome, is the partition of the possible outcome space: the Asha-catchings 
reference class is used to describe the observation, even though that reference class was 
entirely unknown prior to the observation of the outcome. 
LP tells us that, in order to evaluate the evidential import of an observation E for hy-
pothesis H, we should assess the conditional probability P(E|H). In familiar cases of 
Predesignation violation, the choice of H is made post hoc. This biases the results to-
wards finding confirmation when there is none. In the cases I have been considering 
where we ought not use the more specific statement of our evidence, like Fish, it is 
instead the possible values of E that are identified post hoc. Here, we do not get an 
appearance of confirmation when there is none. Instead, by “over-fitting” the choice of 
reference class used in describing the possible outcomes to match the observed result, we 
mask the confirmation that the observation does provide. 
One way to understand what goes wrong here is as follows. We caught a large fish, 
and, noting a particular feature of that fish about which we antecedently had no probabil-
istic beliefs—that the large fish was Asha—we used that particular feature to define a 
space of possible outcomes of the experiment. This was a mistake, since, so far as the 
experiment was concerned, Asha was not special: no matter what the outcome of the 
probabilistic process, we were going to catch some fish, and that fish was going to have 
some particular features that could be used to partition the space of possible outcomes. 
Suppose we had caught a different large fish, Byram. We would then have generated a 
different partition of possible outcomes: we would have assessed the outcome as a 
member of the class of Byram-catchings. If we partition the possible outcomes in such a 
way that the partition would be different for each different outcome, we mask the confir-
mation we can get from the observation by fitting it into a partition that we are prepared 
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to apply uniformly across the various possible outcomes: namely, the partition generated 
by classifying the outcome as a large-fish-catching, a partition about which we did have 
antecedent conditional credences. Using the narrower reference class in effect means that 
each possible outcome of the experiment will be utilized in a different way, thereby 
vitiating the force of the evidence a probabilistic experiment generates by fitting an 
observed outcome into a larger space of possible outcomes. Respecting the Predesigna-
tion Requirement ensures that we bring out an observation’s evidential import, as the 
actual outcome of a probabilistic process that falls into an antecedently well-defined 
space of possible outcomes.   
 
6. The FTA: A Second Reference Class Problem. I now turn to the case of FTA. In 
assessing whether our evidence confirms HM over HU, we are assessing the evidential 
import of the fact that the actual outcome of the “world-creation process” was a state in 
which α is life-sustaining. This outcome can be classified as a member of the class of 
possible states in which some universe is life-sustaining or as a member of the narrower 
class in which α is life-sustaining. The question to ask, given the above analysis, is 
whether the narrower reference class was salient prior to the actual outcome of the 
process. 
It seems clear that it was not: we come to be acquainted with α, and to be in a position 
to know that it, in particular, is life-sustaining, only because α’s big bang, in particular, 
resulted in a life-sustaining universe. So classifying our observation using a partition of 
the possible outcomes that makes reference to α fails to respect the Predesignation 
Requirement. It amounts to fitting our choice of reference class to the actual outcome of 
the probabilistic process, which, as we saw in the Fish case, leads to the false conclusion 
that we have no confirmation when in fact we do. 
The story does not end here, however. For White, in a postscript to his paper, claims 
that we get no confirmation of HM over HU, even if we use the more general statement of 
our evidence, EG. He suggests that the following principle dictates how we are to evaluate 
hypotheses in the light of observation: 
 
Observation Principle. An observation I make gives me evidence for hypothesis 
H only if it is more likely given H that I would make that observation. (White 
2003, 244) 
 
What I have been emphasizing is that, in applying such a principle, we need to be careful 
about how we characterize the observation made – how we classify the content of the 
observation. But White’s point in framing the Observation Principle as he does is that an 
observation involves not only what is observed, but also the subject doing the observing. 
And, White claims, in the FTA case, even if I characterize the content of my observation 
in terms of the broader reference class some life-sustaining universe exists, I get no 
confirmation of HM over HU from my evidence, if I attend to the fact that I am the subject 
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who makes the observation. The reason is that, even though it is more likely that there is 
some life-sustaining universe given HM, it is no more likely that I would observe such a 
universe. Since I couldn’t exist in some other universe, the existence of a non-α life-
sustaining universe is not something I could observe. So positing non-α universes, some 
of which are likely to be life-sustaining, doesn’t raise the probability of my observing 
such a universe. Thus, the observation principle tells us that we get no confirmation of 
HM over HU from either ES or EG. 
But just as the reference class problem arises when we consider how to characterize 
the content of the observation, so too does it arise when we consider how to characterize 
the observer. The outcome we know to obtain is that I observe that α is life-sustaining. 
As noted above, the content of this observation can be characterized by way of a broader 
reference class: I observe that some universe is life-sustaining. But we can also character-
ize the observer by way of a broader reference class: my observation is a member of the 
reference class someone observes that some universe is life-sustaining. Both aspects of 
the actual observation—its content and the observer—need to be classified in some way 
in order to assess the observation’s evidential import.  
This second reference class problem is crucial in assessing FTA. Consider figure 2. The 
actual outcome of the world-creation process—I observe that α is life-sustaining—falls 
into the circular region labeled “I-α” in each square. In the upper row of the diagram, the 
dotted circular region labeled “x-β” represents a possible outcome of the world-creation 
process on which α is not life-sustaining, and so I never exist (and, a fortiori, I never 
observe a life-sustaining universe); but another universe, β, is life-sustaining, and is 
observed to be so by some other observer. Such an outcome is only possible on HM. Now, 
if we partition the space of possible outcomes based on whether someone observes a life-
sustaining universe (left-hand side of the diagram), outcomes like x-β (those that fall 
outside of the I-α circle, but to the left of the vertical line, in the upper-left square) count 
as outcomes of the same type as the actual outcome. If we instead partition the possible 
outcomes based on whether I observe a life-sustaining universe (right-hand side of the 
diagram), outcomes like x-β do not count as outcomes of the same type as the actual 
observed outcome, and so the possibility of such outcomes does not make it more likely 
on HM (as compared to HU) that an outcome of the same type as the actual outcome 
would occur (the unshaded regions of the two squares on the right-hand side of the 
diagram are of equal area – they are simply the outcomes on which I observe a life-
sustaining universe, namely α). 
Thus, whether my observation confirms HM over HU turns on whether I should classify 
my evidence as falling into the reference class observation of life-sustaining universe by 
me or rather into the broader class observation of life-sustaining universe by someone. 
We need to address the reference class problem for the observer (for an extended discus-
sion of this issue, see Bostrom 2002). 
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Figure 2. The space of possible outcomes of the “world-creation process” is partitioned 
in two different ways: on the left-hand side, outcomes are partitioned according to 
whether an observation of a life-sustaining universe is made by someone; on the right-
hand side, outcomes are partitioned according to whether an observation of a life-
sustaining universe is made by me. The actual outcome (where I observe that α is life-
sustaining) is represented by the circle labeled “I-α”. In the upper portion of the diagram, 
the circle labeled x-β represents another possible outcome, in which α is not life-
sustaining, but a different possible universe, β, is observed to be life-sustaining by 
someone else, x. Whether the likelihood of the observed outcome is greater given HM 
than it is given HU (whether the unshaded region is larger in the top row than in the 
bottom row) depends on which partition (left side vs. right side) we use in classifying the 
observation. 
 
White suggests that we answer the question of how to characterize the observer in the 
same way RTE advises us to answer the parallel question about how to characterize the 
content of the observation: according to White’s Observation Principle, an observer ought 
to use the narrowest reference class into which she falls—she ought to classify her 
observation as an observation made specifically by her, as a unique individual—in 
assessing that observation’s evidential import. But given the problems we saw above for 
RTE, we have reason to be suspicious of the parallel solution to the reference class 
problem when it comes to the observer. Instead of White’s Observation Principle, I 
suggest that we approach the question of how to characterize the observer in the same 
way we approached the parallel question of how to characterize the content of the obser-
vation: we should ask whether using the narrower reference class violates the Predesigna-
tion Requirement. 
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The question thus becomes: In the case of our observation that α is life-sustaining, was 
the narrower reference class of observers a salient way to partition the space of possible 
outcomes antecedent to the actual observation of the outcome? Again, it seems clear that 
the answer is no. The partition of the space of possible outcomes of the world-creation 
process determined by my status as the observer of the outcome was no more salient prior 
to the observation of the actual outcome of that process than was the partition determined 
by focusing specifically on α as part of the content. I can classify the possible outcomes 
of the world-creation event as those in which I observe a life-sustaining universe and 
those in which I don’t only post hoc – only because the specific outcome of the process 
(α’s turning out to be life-sustaining, which allows for me to exist) led me to focus on 
myself as observer. So a reference class determined by my own status as observer is an 
inappropriate one to use in assessing the evidential import of my observation. As seen in 
the case of Fish, we shouldn’t characterize the outcome of a probabilistic process using a 
reference class that is salient only because of the specific outcome of the process. Doing 
so mischaracterizes the nature of the probabilistic process and its evidential connection to 
the hypotheses under consideration. By over-fitting our characterization of the outcome 
to the observation made, we mask the confirmation the outcome genuinely confers. 
We might wonder, though, whether it makes sense to extend the Predesignation Re-
quirement to the FTA case in this way. Recall that, in spelling out the rationale behind the 
Predesignation Requirement, I emphasized that violating the Requirement—by using a 
reference class that became salient only as a result of the actual outcome—would lead us 
to use different reference classes given different possible outcomes. In the case of Fish, 
for instance, we are poised to record whichever outcome occurs – whether Asha, or 
Byram, or some other fish is caught. As a consequence, using the identity of the particu-
lar fish we catch to generate a partition means we’ll partition differently in different 
scenarios.  
But in the FTA case, we would not partition the possible outcomes differently if the 
outcome were different—if, for example, β had been life-sustaining, while α was not—
because we would not even exist in such a scenario. As White (2000, 268) notes, “it is not 
as though we were disembodied spirits, waiting for some big bang to produce a universe 
that could accommodate us.” In the FTA case, because our identities as observers are tied 
to the particular universe α, we can only ever observe one kind of outcome—an outcome 
where α is life-sustaining—so there is no threat of our generating problematically gerry-
mandered partitions in each possible outcome scenario. And so, a defender of the Obser-
vation Principle might think, we should use the narrower reference class for the observer 
in the case of FTA, since doing so will not lead to different partitions in different out-
come scenarios. 
The problem with this suggestion is that it in effect treats our observation as an out-
come of a process we were observing, where we were focused, in particular, on whether 
we would come to exist in α. It suggests that the relevant partition of possible outcomes 
divides those outcomes according to whether or not, as observers of the process in 
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question, we observe α—our predesignated potential “home universe”—to be life-
sustaining. But such a picture is no more plausible than the one White mocks: just as “it 
is not as though we were disembodied spirits, waiting for some big bang to produce a 
universe that could accommodate us,” it also is not as though we were disembodied 
spirits, keenly observing α—our designated potential home—and hoping that it, in 
particular, would be able to accommodate us. When considering the probabilistic process 
that led to our existence as observers, we cannot accurately capture the nature of our 
evidence by modeling that process as one that we—as the particular beings we are, tied 
specifically to α—observed. We don’t have the proper perspective on such a process to 
assess its outcomes in terms of the observations we, specifically, could make. 
The nature of the world-creation “process” itself is somewhat mysterious. As noted 
above (fn. 2), it is common in discussions of HM to think of each big bang in the multi-
verse as an isolated chance event, like the spinning of a roulette wheel. This is what 
allows us to apply LP—our principle for assessing the evidential import of our observa-
tions—to hypotheses about the world-creation process. In applying LP, then, it seems we 
would be well-advised to map the unfamiliar scenario—one where we don’t have a firm 
grip on the nature of the probabilistic “process,” and one where our own identities as 
observers are not set in advance—onto a more familiar experimental paradigm. So we 
should not focus on the fact that we couldn’t make observations of different outcomes, 
had they occurred; we should consider how an observer who could make such observa-
tions—an observer who could be seen as the “experimenter” trying to get evidence from 
the results of the probabilistic world-creation process—should assess the outcome 
observed. What would the outcome we know to have occurred—our observing α to be 
life-sustaining—tell an observer positioned to use such an observation, in virtue of 
standing to the world-creation process as we normally stand to our experiments? 
Looked at in this way, the fact that the actual outcome is one in which we observe a 
life-sustaining universe seems irrelevant to the evidential import of our observation. From 
a God’s-eye perspective, we can see that whoever came to exist—in whichever universe 
happened to be life-sustaining—could use her own specific identity to partition the space 
of possible outcomes. But doing so would lead those observers, taken as a whole, to carve 
up the possibility space in different ways, depending on the actual outcome of the pro-
cess. And so, using a uniform partition of the possibility space that was salient before the 
outcome was observed—a partition according to whether someone observes a life-
sustaining universe—more accurately captures the relevant information contained in the 
observation. 
It is helpful to compare this analysis of FTA to Case B*. There, we saw that Jane 
ought not think she has confirmation of HMP over HOP based on her observation. But we 
might wonder why not. After all, the outcome in Jane’s case could be characterized as 
someone observes that someone rolled double-six, rather than Jane observes that some-
one rolled double-six. And the likelihood of the former type of outcome is surely much 
higher on HMP than on HOP. For if HMP is true, there will be worlds in which Jane does 
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not observe any outcome (because she never wakes up), but someone else observes a 
double-six. In Case B*, then, we will get the wrong result—we will falsely conclude that 
Jane gets confirmation of HMP over HOP—if we use the more general reference class in 
characterizing the identity of the observer. 
The reason we get the wrong result if we fail to use the more specific characterization 
of the observer in Case B* is that, unlike in the FTA case, the partition of possible 
outcomes determined by Jane’s specific identity as the observer was antecedently salient 
to Jane. She could antecedently consider the possible outcomes and partition them 
according to what she, in particular, would observe in each case. Such a partition of the 
space of possible outcomes does not rely on Jane’s knowing the actual outcome itself, 
since Jane is antecedently acquainted with herself as a unique observer, and, knowing the 
set-up of the case, she knows that the observations she makes are tied to her specific 
partner’s roll. So, unlike in the FTA case, partitioning the possible outcomes based on the 
specific identity of Jane qua observer does not involve any violation of the Predesigna-
tion Requirement; and it does not result in different partitions given different outcomes. 
Thus Jane, who can legitimately take herself to be the observer of the relevant probabilis-
tic process (rather than just the particular outcome of it), ought to make use of the addi-
tional information that it was she, specifically, who made the observation. 
The evidence I have in the FTA case, by contrast—my observation that α is life-
sustaining—ought to be characterized as a member of a reference class that is broad 
along two dimensions. First, the content of the observation ought to be characterized as 
an outcome on which some universe, rather than specifically α, is life-sustaining, since 
partitions of the possible outcomes that make reference to α become salient only post hoc, 
as a result of the actual outcome of the world-creation process. Second, the observation 
ought to be characterized merely as an observation made by some observer, rather than 
specifically by me, since partitions that make reference to me become salient only as a 
result of the outcome. Putting these two claims together, the statement of the evidence 
that we should use in assessing the likelihood of HM and HU is: someone observes that 
some universe is life-sustaining. Since that outcome was more likely to occur given HM 
than given HU, we have confirmation of HM over HU. 
 
7. Conclusion. My analysis has revealed that the issues surrounding FTA center on two 
distinct reference class problems that arise in evaluating HM. Importantly, one of these 
reference class problems—the question of how to classify the content of an observation—
arises independent of any of the issues about self-locating belief and selection bias that 
have been central to much of the debate about FTA (see, e.g., Bostrom 2002; Bradley 
2009, 2012; Leslie 1988). For consider again the case of Fish. There, our evidence is not 
self-locating: it simply concerns the catching of a fish. And the selection procedure is 
unbiased: the net used is equally capable of catching any fish in the lake. But even in that 
case, we saw that we get the wrong result if we classify the outcome as specifically an 
Asha-catching, rather than more generally as a large-fish-catching. So neither information 
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about the selection procedure, nor the issue of self-locating belief, is central to the 
problem. What we need is a way to rule out the use of overly-specific evidence, even in 
mundane cases like Fish.5 And the way to do that is to take note of how one comes to be 
focused on the more-specific reference class in question. We need to respect the Predes-
ignation Requirement when deciding which partition of the possible outcomes we use in 
assessing the evidence: if a more specific reference class becomes salient only as a result 
of the actual outcome of a probabilistic process, that reference class is not an appropriate 
one to use in characterizing the evidence. 
Draper et al. (2007) and Juhl (2005) offer a different kind of analysis of cases like 
Fish, one that does not involve the rejection of RTE. They both claim that the specific 
evidence, ES (i.e., that we caught Asha), does confirm HL over HS.6 In defending this 
claim, they argue that, while HL makes it no more likely that we would catch Asha given 
that she’s in the lake, it does make it more likely that Asha would be in the lake to be 
caught in the first place. And, if that were true, evaluating our evidence under the Asha-
catchings partition would give us confirmation of HL over HS, since the increased likeli-
hood of Asha’s presence in the lake on HL means that we are more likely to catch Asha 
on HL. So, the claim goes, we are free to reason on the basis of the more specific evi-
dence ES, rather than EG. We’ll get the (correct) verdict that our evidence confirms HL 
over HS either way. Thus, the suggestion is that we need not abandon RTE in order to 
accommodate the Fish case. 
The above line of thought relies on the claim that there is a probabilistic link between 
HL and Asha’s being in the lake: according to the argument just rehearsed, Asha is more 
likely to be in the lake if the lake contains mostly large fish. But there is simply no reason 
to believe in such a link. Since Asha’s essence is, presumably, tied to her specific genetic 
origins, it’s not as if she could have been born to different large-fish parents. So the 
presence of any large fish not in her direct lineage does not raise the probability of her 
being in the lake. 
																																								 																				
5 This suggests that the analysis offered by Bradley (2009, 2012), which focuses on the 
role of bias in the selection procedure in FTA, will not on its own solve the problems 
generated by violations of the Predesignation Requirement. Bradley’s discussion is 
directed at cases with a different structure from that of Fish; it is possible that his analysis 
could be extended in some way to cover such cases. But it is unclear how attending to the 
unbiased selection procedure in such cases will solve the problem. Bradley (2009) does 
suggest one way we might still get confirmation in the FTA case, even if we assume there 
is no selection bias; his suggestion mirrors that made by Draper et al. and Juhl (see 
below). 
6 The cases discussed by Draper, et al. and Juhl do not involve populations of fish in a 
lake; but, since the cases are structurally analogous, I have framed these authors’ claims 
in terms of the Fish example, for ease of exposition. I will note how the points about the 
simpler Fish case translate to the FTA case along the way. 
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Here is one way we might try to justify the claim that there is a probabilistic link be-
tween HL and Asha’s presence in the lake. Suppose the lake was populated as follows. 
First, God decided on the “demographics” He wanted for the lake: either it would be a 
lake of mostly large fish, or a lake of mostly small fish. Then, God selected (through a 
random process) the appropriate number of each kind of fish to make actual, from His 
stock of possible large fish and possible small fish. Since Asha was a possible large fish, 
she had a greater chance of being selected for “actualization” if there were more large 
fish “slots” available. Thus, Asha was more likely to be in the lake given HL than given 
HS. 
But we of course have no reason at all to believe in such a story. Its metaphysical pre-
suppositions are highly dubious, and our credence in its truth is essentially zero. So the 
claim that there is a probabilistic link between HL and Asha’s being in the lake, given the 
way we actually think organisms come into being (i.e., given that a fish’s presence in a 
lake is sensitive only to her direct lineage’s presence in that lake), should be rejected, as 
should the claim that ES confirms HL. 
White (2003, 244) makes a related point about the dubious metaphysical story we 
would need to support the parallel proposal about the FTA case. He considers two ways 
we could defend the claim that there is a probabilistic link between the existence of many 
(non-α) universes and my own existence. First, we might “suppose that I was once an 
unconscious soul waiting to be embodied in whichever universe produced a hospitable 
living organism.” Alternatively, we might reason as follows: “The more universes there 
are, the more living creatures there are. So the more opportunities I had to be picked out 
of the pool of ‘possible beings,’ and hence the greater the likelihood that I should be 
observing anything.” Such stories have no more plausibility in the FTA case than do the 
parallel proposals in the case of Fish. 
A related way to try to defend the claim that there is a probabilistic link between HL 
and Asha’s presence in the lake turns on denying Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of 
origins. I suggested that the existence of more large fish in the lake makes Asha’s pres-
ence no more likely because she could only have been born to her actual parents. But this 
claim might be rejected: if Asha’s existence is not tied to her specific parents, then (one 
might suggest) the presence of additional large fish does make it more likely that she will 
be born (and hence, be in the lake to be caught). 
But rejecting the necessity of origins does not seem to make it any more plausible that 
there is a probabilistic link between the number of large fish and Asha’s existence. If we 
take “being Asha” to be essentially a matter of having some exact genetic property, then 
we can suppose that it is not metaphysically necessary that Asha be born to her actual 
parents. Still, the chance that a fish with that exact genetic property would be in the lake 
seems unconnected to the total number of large fish: even if it is metaphysically possible 
for Asha to be born to different parents, a fish with that exact genetic property is simply 
not going to be born to different parents in any relevantly close possible world, such that 
the probability of Asha’s being in the lake increases with the number of total large fish. 
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We need not insist that there is a metaphysical barrier to Asha’s being born to different 
parents; the merely empirical fact that large fish outside Asha’s direct lineage have no 
chance of giving birth to Asha means that HL makes it no more likely that Asha would be 
in the lake. (The parallel point in the FTA case is that, even if we accept that it is meta-
physically possible that we could have existed in a different universe, there is simply no 
empirically plausible hypothesis according to which we (the specific observers we are) 
would have come to exist in a different universe.) 
The upshot is that we cannot salvage the intuitive verdict that we get confirmation in 
the case of Fish, so long as we insist on using the more specific version of our evidence 
(ES). We really must reject RTE. And, when we turn to the second reference class prob-
lem—the question of how to characterize the observer—we should likewise reject the 
claim that we must always use the most specific reference class available. Here, the 
narrowest reference class is one that classifies the evidence as an observation of mine; 
and there is some initial plausibility to the idea that this reference class will always be the 
appropriate one to use in characterizing my evidence. The reason is that the narrowest 
reference class of observers is a reference class that is, in all typical cases, always salient 
antecedent to observing an outcome: when conducting experiments, or simply observing 
the world around us, we typically have a firm, antecedent grip on our own, unique 
identities. But in the case of FTA, it is precisely this typically-secure grip on our identi-
ties that is at issue, because the probabilistic process we are assessing—the world-
creation event—is one on whose specific outcome our very identities as observers 
depend. Thus, the Predesignation Requirement that compels us to use the more general 
statement of the content of our observation in a simple case like Fish also compels us to 
use the more general characterization of our own identities as observers in the case of 
FTA. 
Putting together our verdicts about how to characterize both the contents of our obser-
vations and the identity of the observer, we get the result that, properly applied, LP shows 
that we do indeed get confirmation of HM over HU from the evidence we have. 
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